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Abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are often criti-
cized for being susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Most successful defense strategies adopt adver-
sarial training or random input transformations
that typically require retraining or fine-tuning the
model to achieve reasonable performance. In this
work, our investigations of intermediate represen-
tations of a pre-trained DNN lead to an interesting
discovery pointing to intrinsic robustness to ad-
versarial attacks. We find that we can learn a gen-
erative classifier by statistically characterizing the
neural response of an intermediate layer to clean
training samples. The predictions of multiple such
intermediate-layer based classifiers, when aggre-
gated, show unexpected robustness to adversarial
attacks. Specifically, we devise an ensemble of
these generative classifiers that rank-aggregates
their predictions via a Borda count-based consen-
sus. Our proposed approach uses a subset of the
clean training data and a pre-trained model, and
yet is agnostic to network architectures or the ad-
versarial attack generation method. We show ex-
tensive experiments to establish that our defense
strategy achieves state-of-the-art performance on
the ImageNet validation set.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN’s) have shown outstanding
performance on many computer vision tasks such as im-
age classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), speech recogni-
tion (Hinton et al., 2012), and video classification (Karpathy
et al., 2014). Despite showing superhuman capabilities in
the image classification task (He et al., 2015), the existence
of adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) have raised
questions on the reliability of neural network solutions for
safety-critical applications.
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Figure 1. Overview of REGroup: Rank-aggregating Ensemble of
Generative classifiers for robust predictions. REGroup uses a pre-
trained network, and constructs layer-wise generative classifiers
modeled by a mixture distribution of the positive and negative
pre-activation neural responses at each layer. At test time, an input
sample’s neural responses are tested with generative classifiers to
obtain ranking preferences of classes at each layer. These prefer-
ences are aggregated using Borda count based preferential voting
theory to make final prediction. Note: construction of layer-wise
generative classifiers is a one time process.
Adversarial examples are carefully manipulated adaptations
of an input, generated with the intent to fool a classifier
into misclassifying them. Recently, it has been shown that
adversarial examples are not limited to images but also
exists in automatic speech recognition (Scho¨nherr et al.,
2018), text (Behjati et al., 2019) and video (Zajac et al.,
2019) classificaiton. Some example of failures of neural
network-based security-critical applications are: an AI as-
sistant incorrectly authenticating an impostor’s voice and
providing access to the confidential content (Chokshi, 2018),
a vision-based driver assistance system incorrectly recogniz-
ing a stop sign as a speed limit sign, (Eykholt et al., 2018),
which may lead to fatal accidents.
One of the reasons for the attention that adversarial exam-
ples garnered is the ease with which they can be generated
for a given model by simply maximizing the corresponding
loss function. This is achieved by simply using a gradient
based approach that finds a small perturbation at the input
which leads to a large change in the output (Szegedy et al.,
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2013). This apparent instability in neural networks is most
pronounced for deep architectures that have an accumula-
tion effect over the layers. This results in taking the small,
additive, adversarial noise at the input and amplifies it to
substantially noisy feature maps at intermediate layers that
eventually influences the softmax probabilities enough to
misclassify the perturbed input sample. This observation
of amplification of input noise over the layers is not new,
and has been pointed out in the past (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Xie et al., 2019). The recent work by (Xie et al., 2019)
addresses this issue by introducing feature denoising blocks
in a network and training them with adversarial generated
examples.
The iterative nature of generating adversarial examples
makes their use in training to generate defenses compu-
tationally very intensive. For instance, the adversarially
trained feature denoising model proposed by (Xie et al.,
2019) takes 38 hours on 128 Nvidia V100 GPUs to train
a baseline ResNet-101 with ImageNet. While we leverage
this observation of noise amplification over the layers, our
proposed approach avoids any training or fine-tuning of the
model. Instead, we use a representative subset of training
samples and their layer-wise pre-activation responses to con-
struct nonparametric generative classifiers, which are then
combined in an ensemble using ranking preferences.
Generative classifiers have achieved varying degrees of suc-
cess as defense strategies against adversarial attacks (Partha
et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019; Schott et al., 2019). Recently,
(Fetaya et al., 2020) studied the class-conditional generative
classifiers and concluded that it is impossible to guarantee
robustness of such models. More importantly, they high-
light the challenges in training generative classifiers using
maximum likelihood based objective and their limitations
w.r.t. discriminative ability and identification of out-of-
distribution samples. While we propose to use generative
classifiers, we avoid using likelihood based measures for
making classification decisions. Instead, we use rank-order
preferences of these classifiers which are then combined
using a Borda count-based voting scheme. Borda counts
have been used in collective decision making and are known
to be robust to various manipulative attacks (Rothe, 2019).
In this paper, we present our defense against adversarial at-
tacks on deep networks, referred to as Rank-aggregating En-
semble of Generative classifiers for robust predictions (RE-
Group). At inference time, our defense requires white-box
access to a pre-trained model to collect the pre-activation
responses at intermediate layers to make the final predic-
tion. We use the training data to build our generative classi-
fier models. Nonetheless, our strategy is simple, network-
agnostic, does not require any training or fine-tuning of
the network, and works well for a variety of adversarial
attacks, even with varying degress of hardness. Consistent
with recent trends, we focus only on the ImageNet dataset
to evaluate the robustness of our defense and report perfor-
mance superior to recent defenses that rely on adversarial
training (Kurakin et al., 2016) and random input transfor-
mation (Raff et al., 2019) based approaches. Finally, we
present extensive analysis of our defense with two different
architectures (ResNet and VGG) on different targeted and
untargeted attacks. Our primary contributions are summa-
rized below:
− We present REGroup, a retraining free, model-agnostic
defense strategy that leverages an ensemble of generative
classifiers over intermediate layers of the model.
− We model each generative classifier as a simple mixture
distribution of neural responses obtained from a subset of
training samples. We discover that both positive and neg-
ative pre-activation values contain information that can
help correctly classify adversarially perturbed samples.
− We leverage the robustness inherent in Borda-count
based consensus over the generative classifiers.
− We show extensive comparisons and analysis experi-
ments on the ImageNet dataset spanning a variety of
adversarial attacks.
2. Related Work
Several defense techniques have been proposed to make
neural networks robust to adversarial attacks. Broadly, we
can categorize them into two approaches that: 1. Mod-
ify training procedure or modify input before testing; 2.
Modify network architecture or add/change network hyper-
parameters, optimization procedure, activation functions
etc.
Modify Training/Modify Inputs During Testing: Some
approaches of defenses in this category are mentioned be-
low. Adversarial training (Miyato et al., 2016; Zheng et al.,
2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) regularizes the neu-
ral network to reduce the over-fitting and in turn, improves
the robustness. Data compression (Bhagoji et al., 2018;
Das et al., 2017) suppresses the high-frequency compo-
nents and presents an ensemble-based defense approach.
Data randomization (Wang et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017b;
Zantedeschi et al., 2017) based approaches apply random
transformations to the input to defend against adversarial
examples by reducing their effectiveness.
However, it is shown in (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017)
and (Shin & Song, 2017) that we can still generate ad-
versarial examples for adversarially trained DNN’s and for
compression based defenses respectively.
Modify Network/Network Add-ons: Defenses under this
category are either detection only or do both detection and
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correction. The aim of detection only defenses is to high-
light if an example is adversarial and prevent it from further
processing. These approaches include employing a detector
sub-network (Metzen et al., 2017), training the main clas-
sifier with an outlier class (Grosse et al., 2017), using con-
volution filter statistics (Li & Li, 2017), or applying feature
squeezing (Xu et al., 2017) to detect adversarial examples.
However, all of these methods have shown to be ineffective
against strong adversarial attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a;
Sharma & Chen, 2018). Full defense approaches include ap-
plying defensive distillation (Papernot et al., 2016; Papernot
& McDaniel, 2017) to use the knowledge from the output of
the network to re-train the original model and improve the
resilience of a network to small perturbations. Another ap-
proach is to augment the network with a sub-network called
Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN) to detect the per-
turbations; if the perturbation is detected, then PRN is used
to classify the input image. However, later it was shown
that (C& W) attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) successfully
defeated the defensive distillation approach.
ImageNet Focused Defense Approaches: A few ap-
proaches have been proposed for the ImageNet dataset:
Most of these approaches are based on input transformations
or image denoising. Almost all the defenses designed for
ImageNet have failed a thorough evaluation. A list of such
defenses along with a thorough evaluation can be viewed at
(Madry et al.). (Prakash et al., 2018) and (Liao et al., 2018)
claimed 81% and 75% accuracy respectively under adversar-
ial attacks. But after through evaluation (Athalye & Carlini,
2018) and accounting for obfuscated gradients (Athalye
et al., 2018), both accuracies were reduced to 0%. Similarly,
(Xie et al., 2017a) and (Guo et al., 2017) claimed 86% and
75% respectively, but these were also reduced to 0% (Atha-
lye et al., 2018). A different approach proposed in (Kannan
et al., 2018) claimed accuracy 27.9% but later it was also
reduced to 0.1% (Engstrom et al., 2018).
For a comprehensive related work on adversarial attacks and
defenses, we suggest reader to refer (Yuan et al., 2019) and
(Chakraborty et al., 2018).
3. REGroup Methodology
Well-trained deep neural networks have a hierarchical struc-
ture, where the early layers transform inputs to feature
spaces capturing local or more generic information, while
later layers aggregate the local information to learn more se-
mantically meaningful representations. In REGroup, we use
many of the higher layers and learn class-conditional gen-
erative classifiers as simple mixture-distributions estimated
from the pre-activation neural responses at each layer from a
subset of training samples. An ensemble of these layer-wise
generative classifiers is used to make the final prediction by
performing a Borda count-based rank-aggregation. Ranking
preferences have been used extensively in robust fitting prob-
lems in computer vision (Chin et al., 2011; jun Chin et al.,
2009; Tiwari & Anand, 2018), and we show its effective-
ness in introducing robustness in DNNs against adversarial
attacks.
Fig. 1 illustrates the overall working of REGroup. The ap-
proach has three main components: First, we use a layer as a
generative classifier that produces a ranking preference over
all classes. Second, each of these class-conditional genera-
tive classifiers are modeled using a mixture-distribution over
the neural responses of the corresponding layer. Finally, the
individual layer’s class ranking preferences are aggregated
using Borda count-based scoring to make the final predic-
tions. We introduce the notation below and discuss each of
these steps in detail in the subsections that follow.
Notation: In this paper, we will always use `, i and j for
indexing the `th layer, ith feature map and the jth input
sample respectively. The true and predicted class label will
be denoted by y and ŷ respectively. A classifier can be
represented in a functional form as ŷ = F(x), it takes an
input x and predicts its class label ŷ . We define φ`i as the
`th layer’s ith pre-activation feature map, i.e., the neural
responses before they pass through the activation function.
For convolutional layers, this feature map φ`i is a 2D array,
while for a fully connected layer, it is a scalar value.
3.1. DNN Layers as Generative Classifiers
We use the highest k layers of a DNN as generative classi-
fiers that use the pre-activation neural responses to produce
a ranking preferences over all classes. The layer-wise gener-
ative classifiers are modeled as a class-conditional mixture
distribution, which is estimated using only a pre-trained
network and a small subset S of the training data. Let S
contain only correctly classified training samples1, which
we can further divide into M subsets, one for each class i.e
S = {∪My=1Sy}, where Sy is the subset containing samples
that have labels y.
3.1.1. LAYERWISE NEURAL RESPONSE DISTRIBUTIONS
Our preliminary observations indicated that while the ReLU
activations truncate the negative pre-activations during the
forward pass, these values still contain semantically mean-
ingful information. Our quantitative ablative studies (see
Fig. 3) confirm this observation and additionally, on oc-
casion, we find that the negative pre-activations are com-
plementary to the positive ones. Since the pre-activation
features are real-valued, we compute the features φ`ij for
the jth sample xj , and define its positive and negative re-
sponse accumulators as P `ij =
∑
max(0,φ`ij ) and N
`i
j =
1We took 50,000 out of ∼ 1.2 millions training images from
ImageNet dataset, 50 per class.
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max(0,−φ`ij ) respectively.
For convolutional layers, these accumulators represent the
overall strength of positive and negative pre-activation re-
sponses respectively, when collected over the spatial dimen-
sions of the ith feature map of the `th layer. On the other
hand, for the linear layers, the accumulation becomes trivial
with each neuron having a scalar response φ`ij . We can now
represent the `th layer by the positive and negative response
accumulator vectors denoted by P `j and N
`
j respectively.
We normalize these vectors and define the layer-wise prob-
ability mass function (PMF) for the positive and negative
responses as P`j =
P `j
||P `j ||1
and N`j =
N`j
||N`j ||1
respectively.
Our interpretation of P`j and N`j as a PMF could be justified
by drawing an analogy to the softmax output, which is also
interpreted as a PMF. However, it is worth emphasizing
that we chose the linear rescaling of the accumulator vec-
tors rather than directly applying a softmax normalization.
By separating out the positive and negative accumulators,
we obtain two independent representations for each layer,
which is beneficial to our rank-aggregating ensemble dis-
cussed in the following sections. A softmax normalization
over a feature map comprising of positive and negative
responses would have entirely suppressed the negative re-
sponses, discarding all its constituent semantic information.
An additional benefit of the linear scaling is its simple com-
putation. Algorithm 1 summarizes the computation of the
layer-wise PMFs for a given training sample.
Algorithm 1 Layerwise PMF of neural responses. H ×W
represents the spatial dimensions of pre-activation features.
For `th convolutional layer the dimensions of feature maps
H ×W = r` × s`, and for linear layers the dimensions of
neuron output H ×W = 1× 1.
Input: xj pre-activation features φ`ij ∈ RH×W
for ` ∈ [1..n] do
P `ij =
∑
max(0,φ`ij ), ∀ i (sum over H, W)
N `ij =
∑
max(0,−φ`ij ), ∀ i (sum over H, W)
end
P `j ← P `j + δ, N `j ← N `j + δ
P`ij ←
P `ij∑
i P`ij
, N`ij ←
N`ij∑
i N`ij
(PMFs)
3.1.2. LAYERWISE GENERATIVE CLASSIFIERS
We model the layerwise generative classifiers for class y as a
class-conditional mixture of distributions, with each mixture
component as the PMFs P`j and N`j for a given training
sample xj ∈ Sy. The generative classifiers corresponding
to the positive and negative neural responses are then defined
as the following mixture of PMFs
C+`y =
∑
j:xj∈Sy
λjP`j , C−`y =
∑
j:xj∈Sy
λjN`j (1)
where the weights λj are nonnegative and add up to one
in the respective equations. We choose the weights to be
proportional to the softmax probability value as predicted
by the network given the input xj . Using the subset of train-
ing samples S, we construct the class-conditional mixture
distributions, C+`y and C−`y at each layer ` only once. At
inference time, we input a test sample xj , from the test set
T , to the network and compute the PMFs P`j and N`j using
Algorithm 1. As our test input is a PMF and the generative
classifier is also a mixture distribution, we simply use the
KL-Divergence between the classifier model C+` and the
test sample P`j as a classification score as
PKL(`, y) =
∑
i
C+`iy log
(
C+`iy
P`i
)
,∀y ∈ {1,. . . ,M}
(2)
and similarly for the negative PMFs
NKL(`, y) =
∑
i
C−`iy log
(
C−`iy
N`i
)
,∀y ∈ {1,. . . ,M}
(3)
We use a simple classification rule and select the predicted
class ŷ as the one with the smallest KL-Divergence with the
test sample PMF. However, rather than identifying ŷ , at this
stage we are only interested in rank-ordering the classes,
which we simply achieve by sorting the KL-Divergences
(Eqns. (2) and (3)) in ascending order. The resulting ranking
preferences of classes for the `th layer are given below in
Eqns. (4) and (5) respectively.
R`+ = [R
`1
+ , R
`2
+ , ..., R
`y
+ , ..., R
`M
+ ] (4)
R`− = [R
`1
− , R
`2
− , ..., R
`y
− , ..., R
`M
− ] (5)
3.2. Robust Predictions with Rank Aggregation
Rank aggregation based preferential voting for making
group decisions is widely used in selecting a winner in
a democratic setup (Rothe, 2019). The basic premise of
preferential voting is that n voters are allowed to rank m
candidates in the order of their preferences. The rankings of
all n voters are then aggregated to make a final prediction.
Borda count (Black et al., 1958) is one of the approaches for
preferential voting that relies on aggregating the rankings
of all the voters to make a collective decision (Rothe, 2019;
Kahng et al., 2019). There exist other voting strategies
to find a winner out of m different choices. Some of the
popular ones are Plurality voting (Van Newenhizen, 1992),
and Condorcet winner (Young, 1988). In Plurality voting,
the winner would be the one who gets the maximum fraction
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of votes, while Condorcet winner is the one who gets the
majority votes.
3.2.1. RANK AGGREGATION USING BORDA COUNT
Borda count is a generalization of the majority voting. In a
two-candidates case it is equivalent to majority vote. The
Borda count for a candidate is the sum of the number of
candidates ranked below it by each voter. In our setting,
while processing a test sample xj ∈ T , every layer acts as
two independent voters based on P`and N`. The number of
classes i.e M is the number of candidates. The Borda count
for yth class at the `th layer is denoted byB`y = B`y+ +B
`y
− ,
where B`y+ and B
`y
− are the individual Borda count of both
the voters and computed as shown in equation (6).
B`y+ = (M −R`y+ ), B`y− = (M −R`y− ) (6)
3.2.2. HYPERPARAMETER SETTINGS
We aggregate the Borda counts of highest k layers of the net-
work, which is the only hyperparameter to set in REGroup.
Let B:ky denote the aggregated Borda count of yth class
from the last k layers irrespective of the type (convolutional
or fully connected). Here, n is the total number of lay-
ers. The final prediction would be the class with maximum
aggregated Borda count.
B:ky =
n∑
`=n−k+1
B`y
=
n∑
`=n−k+1
B`y+ +B
`y
− , ∀y ∈ {1..M}
ŷ = argmaxy B
:ky (7)
To determine the value of k, we evaluate REGroup on
10,000 correctly classified samples from the ImageNet Val-
idation set at each layer, using per layer Borda count i.e
ŷ = argmaxy B
`y. We select k to be the number of later
layers at which we get at-least 75% accuracy. This can be
viewed in the context of the confidence of individual layers
on discriminating samples of different classes. We selected
k to be the number of layer with confidence score atleast
0.75. We follow the above heuristic and found k = 5 for
both the architectures ResNet-50 and VGG-19, hence, we
use k = 5 in all our experiments. An ablation study with all
possible values of k is included in section 4.8.
4. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we evaluate REGroup against various attacks
and compare with the state-of-the art methods. We first
discuss the various attacks we use in our experiments.
4.1. Adversarial Attacks
The generation process for constructing an adversarial ex-
ample xadv involves corrupting a clean sample x by adding
a small perturbation δ i.e xadv = x + δ, so that network
will classify xadv into an incorrect class. We evaluate RE-
Group against gradient based and decision based attacks.
We use FoolBox (Rauber et al., 2017) with different pertur-
bation budgets to generate adversarial examples.
Gradient Based Attacks: Attacks under this category have
white-box access to the network, i.e the attacker has access
to the gradient, weights, and network architecture.
PGD: Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al.,
2017) can be viewed as a multi-step variant of FGSM (Good-
fellow et al., 2014). The generation of adversarial examples
takes the form of an iterative approach, whose update at the
tth step can be expressed as:
xadvt =
∏
P(x)
(
xadvt−1+α · sgn
(∇XL(g(xadvt−1; θ), y))) (8)
Here, α is the step size,
∏
P(x)
is the projection operator,
with the corresponding perturbation bounded by [x−,x+].
DeepFool: This attack method finds the nearest decision
boundary and tries to generate an adversarial example by
iteratively perturbing an image until it is pushed across a
class boundary and the network changes its top prediction
to a different class (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016).
C& W: This method (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) generates
an adversarial example by solving an optimization problem
that aims to find the smallest Lp bounded perturbation while
simultaneously misclassifying the input.
Trust Region Based Attack: This attack (Yao et al., 2019)
solves a trust region based optimization problem (Conn
et al., 2000) to get an adversarial perturbation.
Decision Based Attacks: Attacks in this category are based
on the final decision of the model. These attacks are more
relevant to real-world practical learning-based applications
where prediction scores or logits are not accessible.
Boundary Attack: This attack begins with a large perturba-
tion (hence already an adversarial image) and then performs
a random walk along the decision boundary between the
adversarial and the non-adversarial region in a manner that
it remains in the adversarial region but moves closer to the
target image (Brendel et al., 2017).
Spatial Attack: This attack generates adversarial examples
by modifying the input image using adversarially generated
rotation and translations (Engstrom et al., 2019).
4.2. Experimental Setup
Architectures: We use two different network architectures
ResNet-502 and VGG-193, both with ImageNet pre-trained
2https://download.pytorch.org/models/resnet50-19c8e357.pth
3https://download.pytorch.org/models/vgg19-dcbb9e9d.pth
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weights.
Datasets: We present our evaluations and compar-
isons only on ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009). We use
ImageNet-V50K to refer to the full ImageNet validation
set and, ImageNet-V10K, and ImageNet-V2K to refer to
random subsets of the full ImageNet validation set of sizes
10,000 (10 per class), and 2000 (2 per class) respectively,
each comprising only of correctly classified images. The
subsets, ImageNet-V10K and ImageNet-V2K would be
different for ResNet-50 and VGG-19, since an image classi-
fied correctly by ResNet-50 need not be classified correctly
by the VGG-19.
4.3. Comparison with Adv-Training/Fine-tuning
We evaluate our performance on clean samples as well as
adversarial examples generated using PGD ( = 16) from
ImageNet-V50K , and compare it with prior state-of-the-art
works (Raff et al., 2019) and (Xie et al., 2019). The results
are reported in Table 1, and we see that REGroup outper-
forms the state-of-the-art input transformation based defense
BaRT (Raff et al., 2019), both in terms of the clean and ad-
versarial samples. We see that while our performance on
clean samples decreases when compared to adversarial train-
ing, it improves significantly on adversarial examples with
a high  = 16. While our method is not directly comparable
with (Xie et al., 2019) because the base models are different,
a similar decrease in the accuracy over clean samples is
reported in their paper. The tradeoff between robustness and
the standard accuracy has been studied in (Dohmatob, 2018)
and (Tsipras et al., 2018).
An important observation to make with this experiment is, if
we set aside the base models of ResNets and compare Top-1
accuracies on clean samples of full ImageNet validation
set, our method (REGroup) without any adv-training/fine-
tuning either outperforms or performs similar to the state-of-
the-art adv-training/fine-tuning based methods (Raff et al.,
2019; Xie et al., 2019).
4.3.1. AGAINST PGD ADVERSARIAL STRENGTH
We evaluate REGroup w.r.t the maximum perturbation of
the adversary. The results are reported in figure 2. RE-
Group outperforms both the adversarial training (Kurakin
et al., 2016) and BaRT (Raff et al., 2019). Both adversar-
ial training and BaRT have shown protection against PGD
adversarial attacks with a maximum perturbation strength
 = 16 and  = 32 respectively, however we additionally
show the results with  = 40 on full ImageNet validation
set. We also note that with increasing perturbation strength
we see that our defense’s accuracy is also strictly decreas-
ing. This is in accordance with (Carlini et al., 2019), where
transitioning from a clean image to noise should yield a
downward slope in accuracy, else there could be some form
Clean Images Attacked Images
Model Top-1 Top-5 Top-1 Top-5
ResNet-50 76 93 0.0 0.0
Inception v3 78 94 0.7 4.4
ResNet-152 79 94 - -
Inception v3 w/Adv. Train 78 94 1.5 5.5
ResNet-152 w/Adv. Train 63 - - -
ResNet-152 w/Adv. Train w/ denoise 66 - - -
ResNet-50-BaRT, k = 5 65 85 16 51
ResNet-50-BaRT, k = 10 65 85 36 57
ResNet-50-REGroup 66 86 22 65
Table 1. Accuracy (%) comparison with adversarial training (Ku-
rakin et al., 2016), (Xie et al., 2019) and fine-tuning BaRT (Raff
et al., 2019) approaches. Dataset: ImageNet-V50K. The attacked
images are generated using PGD with  = 16. Clean Images are
the non-attacked original images. REGroup outperforms state-of-
the-art adversarial training/fine-tuning methods. The results are
divided into three blocks, the top block include original networks,
middle block include defense approaches based on adversarial
re-training/fine-tunining of original networks, bottom block is our
defense without re-training/fine-tuning. Results of the competing
methods are taken from their respective papers. ’-’ indicate the
results were not provided in the respective papers.
of gradient masking involved.
Figure 2. Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy(%) comparison with adversar-
ial training based method (Kurakin et al., 2016) and fine-tuning
using random input transformations based method (BaRT) (Raff
et al., 2019) with Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) steps
10 and 40, against the PGD perturbation strength ().Dataset:
ImageNet-V50K. The results of the competing methods are taken
from their respective papers. We further show accuracy of RE-
Group w.r.t maximum perturbation strength  = 40.
4.4. Performance on Un-Targeted Attacks
We evaluate REGroup on various untargeted attacks and
report results in table 2. We generated adversarial examples
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for ImageNet-V10K using ResNet-50 and VGG-19. The
perturbation budgets for the respective attacks are listed
in the table caption. With the exception of the maximum
perturbation allowed and the Boundary Attack, where we
used 500 iterations for adversary generation, we used default
parameters given by FoolBox (Rauber et al., 2017). We
observe that the performance of our defense is quite similar
for both the models employed. This is due to the attack-
agnostic nature of our defense. We achieve 48% accuracy
(ResNet-50) for PGD attack using our defense which is
significant given that PGD is considered to be one of the
strongest attacks among the class of first order adversaries.
ResNet-50 VGG-19
SMax REGroup SMax REGroup
Attacks #S T1(%) T1(%) #S T1(%) T1(%)
PGD 9997 0 48 9887 0 46
DFool 9789 0 61 9939 0 55
C&W 10000 0 40 10000 0 38
Trust Region 10000 0 41 9103 0 45
Boundary 10000 0 50 10000 0 50
Spatial 2624 0 36 2634 0 30
Clean Images 10000 100 88 10000 100 76
Table 2. Performance on Un-Targeted Adversarial Attacks.
Dataset: ImageNet-V10K. Top-1 ( %) classification accu-
racy comparison between SoftMax (SMax) and REGroup. #S is
the number of images for which the attacker is successfully able to
generate adversarial examples using the respective attack models
and the accuracies are reported with respect to the #S samples,
hence the 0% accuracies with the SoftMax (SMax). PGD and
Trust Region both use L∞ distance metric with  = 4 and  = 2
respectively. C&W and DeepFool use L2 distance metric with
 = 4 and  = 2 respectively.
4.5. Performance on Targeted Attacks
We consider ImageNet-V2K for targeted attacks. We
choose a target at random from the 1000 classes of Ima-
geNet, leaving out the ground-truth class. We report perfor-
mance on PGD and C&W targeted attacks in table 3.
ResNet-50 VGG-19
SMax REGroup SMax REGroup
Attacks T1 T1 T1 T1
PGD 0 47 0 31
C&W 0 46 0 38
Clean Images 100 86 100 72
Table 3. Performance on Targeted Adversarial Attacks. Dataset:
ImageNet-V2K. Top-1 (T1 in %) classification accuracy com-
parison between SoftMax (SMax) and the REGroup based classifi-
cation at test time.
4.6. Performance on PGD Attack with High Confidence
We evaluate REGroup on PGD examples on which the
network makes highly confident predictions using Soft-
Max. We generate un-targeted and targeted adversarial
examples using PGD attack with a constraint that the net-
work’s confidence of the prediction of adversarial examples
is at-least 90%, for this experiment we do not put constraint
on the adversarial perturbation i.e . For targeted attack
we select a target class uniformly at random from the 1000
classes leaving out the true class. Results are reported in
table 4.
ResNet-50 VGG-19
SMax REGroup SMax REGroup
Attacks #S T1(%) T1(%) #S T1(%) T1(%)
PGD (un-targeted) 2000 0 21 2000 0 19
PGD (targeted) 2000 0 23 2000 0 17
Table 4. Performance on PGD Adversarial Examples with high
confidences (≥ 90%). Dataset: ImageNet-V2K. Top-1 ( %)
classification accuracy comparison between SoftMax (SMax) and
REGroup. #S is the number of images for which the attacker
is successfully able to generate adversarial examples using the
respective attack models and the accuracies are reported with
respect to the #S samples, hence the 0% accuracies with the
SoftMax (SMax).
4.7. BPDA Attack and Gradient Masking
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA).
BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018) is one of the key techniques
developed to identify shattered gradients in a network which
mask gradients and thereby ‘seem’ to defend against other
attacks. Let fk(.) be the non-differentiable component in
the neural network represented by f1,2,...,n(.). To calculate
the gradient i.e ∇xf in the backward pass of BPDA, the
non-differentiable fk(.) is replaced by its smooth approx-
imation g(x) ≈ fk(x). In most cases, a transformation is
applied to images which is non-differentiable and therefore
approximations like g(x) ≈ x work pretty well.
In REGroup, we rank-aggregate the preferences of highest
k layers to predict the label of an input sample. As rank-
ing preferences requires a sorting operation, which leads
to discontinuities and undefined gradients, it is difficult to
design a smooth approximation to get BPDA to work. A
similar argument is made in (Xiao et al., 2020) where the
k-winner takes all based activation results in non-smooth
feature outputs at different layers. We are not aware of any
smooth approximation for the ranking and vote aggregation
part of REGroup. Furthermore, theoretical groundings of
Borda count for collective decision making (Rothe, 2019)
indicates that in order to change the final outcome, ma-
nipulators have to manipulate the voters so that they vote
strategically and change their rankings accordingly. It has
been shown that such manipulations of more than two vot-
ers in Borda count based preferential voting scheme is an
NP-complete problem (Rothe, 2019; Conitzer et al., 2007;
Brelsford et al., 2008; Davies et al., 2011; Betzler et al.,
2011; Davies et al., 2014). Even if there exists a smooth
approximation, to construct successful BPDA attacks on
REGroup, the manipulations necessary would be as hard as
NP-complete problems.
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Figure 3. Effect of Considering Positive and Negative Pre-Activation Responses.
We consider three variants of Borda count rank aggregation from later k layers. Pos: B:ky =
∑n
`=n−k+1B
`y
+ , Neg:
B:ky =
∑n
`=n−k+1B
`y
− , and Pos+Neg: B
:ky =
∑n
`=n−k+1B
`y
+ + B
`y
− . We report the Top-1 accuracy (%) of the un-
targeted (UN) attacks experiment as set up in table 2 (DF: DFool, C&W, TR: Trust Region, BD: Boundary, SP: Spatial),
in figure 2 (PGD2 and PGD4, with  = 2 and 4 respectively) and targeted (TAR) attacks in table 3.‘V50K clean’ and
‘V10K clean’ corresponds to the experiment ResNet-50-REGroup of table 1 and VGG-19 clean images of table 2. From
the bar chart it is evident that in some experiments Pos performs better than Neg (e.g UN TR) while in others Neg is
better than Pos only (e.g UN DF). It is also evident that Pos+Neg occasionally improve the overall performance, and the
improvement seems significant in the targeted C&W attacks for both the ResNet-50 and VGG-19. We leave it to the design
choice of the application, if inference time is an important parameter, then one may choose either Pos or Neg to reduce the
inference time to approximately half of what is reported in table 6.
Figure 4. Ablation study for accuracy vs no. of layers (k) on VGG.
‘Agg’ stands for using aggregated Borda count B:ky . PGD, DFool,
C&W and Trust Region are the same experiments as reported in
table 2, but with all possible values of k. ”Per Layer V10K” stands
for evaluation using per layer Borda count i.e ŷ = argmaxy B
`y
on a separate 10,000 correctly classified subset of validation set.
In all our experiments we choose the k-highest layers where
‘Per Layer V10K’ has at-least 75% accuracy. A reasonable
change in this accuracy criteria of 75% would not affect the
results on adversarial attacks significantly. However, a substantial
change (to say 50%) deteriorates the performance on clean sample
significantly. The phenomenon of decrease in accuracy of clean
samples vs robustness has been studied in (Dohmatob, 2018) and
(Tsipras et al., 2018).
Checking Gradient Masking. To further ensure that our
proposed method is not masking the gradients, we evalu-
ate on a strong gradient-free SPSA (Uesato et al., 2018)
attack. In (Uesato et al., 2018), it is reported that PGD
and SPSA both found quite similar adversarial perturba-
tions for most images which highlights the effectiveness of
SPSA attack. We use 300 iterations of SPSA along with
early stop loss thresh = 0. This condition makes the attack
terminate when it finds a misclassification and not run for all
the steps. We consider a batch size of 32 images, with  = 4
as the maximum perturbation budget in the L∞ distance
metric. The other parameters are used as in the implementa-
tion of the attack in the Cleverhans library (Papernot et al.,
2018). We observe that we are able to achieve a higher
accuracy as compared to the gradient based attacks, which
ensures REGroup is not masking the gradients.
ResNet-50 VGG-19
SMax REGroup SMax REGroup
Attacks #S T1(%) T1(%) #S T1(%) T1(%)
SPSA ( = 4) 861 0 71 1014 0 64
SPSA ( = 8) 1199 0 70 1350 0 63
Table 5. Performance on un-targeted SPSA Adversarial Attack.
Dataset: ImageNet-V2K. Top-1 ( %) classification accuracy
comparison between SoftMax (SMax) and REGroup. #S is the
number of images for which the attacker is successfully able to
generate adversarial examples and the accuracies are reported
with respect to the #S samples, hence the 0% accuracies with the
SoftMax (SMax).
4.8. Analysis and Ablation Study
In this section, we study the impact of number of lay-
ers/voters and of considering both positive and negative
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pre-activation responses.
Number of layers (k): We report performance of RE-
Group on various attacks reported in table 2 for all possible
values of k. The accuracy of VGG-19 w.r.t. the various
values of k is plotted in figure 4. We observe the similar ac-
curacy vs k graph for ResNet-50 and note that a reasonable
choice of k made based on this graph does not significantly
impact REGroup’s performance.
Effect of positive and negative pre-activation responses:
We report evaluate the impact of using positive, negative
and a combination of both pre-activation responses on the
performance of REGroup on various attacks and clean sam-
ples in figure 3.
Inference time using REGroup: We use PyTorch for all
our experiments and a GPU is only required for extracting
layer outputs and adversarial example generation. Since
we suggest to use REGroup during test time, we compare
the inference time with SoftMax for both ResNet-50 and
VGG-19 experiments on both GPU and CPU. The inference
time is reported in table 6.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a simple, scalable, and
practical defense strategy that is model agnostic and does
not require any re-training or fine-tuning. We suggest to use
REGroup at test time to make a pre-trained network robust
to adversarial perturbations.
ResNet-50 VGG-19
SMax REGroup SMax REGroup
GPU CPU GPU CPU GPU CPU GPU CPU
Time(s) 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.35 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.64
Table 6. Inference Time Comparison. REGroup vs SoftMax: We
use a workstation with an i7-8700 CPU and GTX 1080 GPU.
Using challenging adversarial attacks created on ImageNet,
we have shown that the proposed defense, REGroup, per-
formed competitively in comparison to state-of-the-art de-
fenses (Raff et al., 2019; Kurakin et al., 2016) that have
a clear advantage of adversarial training / fine-tuning the
base network. There are three main reasons that justify the
success of REGroup. Firstly, instead of using a maximum
likelihood based prediction, REGroup adopts a ranking
preference based approach. Secondly, aggregation of prefer-
ences from multiple layers leads to group decision making,
unlike SoftMax that relies on the output of the last layer only.
Thirdly, there exists inherent robustness of Borda count in
rank aggregation. It is well established that Borda count
is robust to noise in rankings of individual voters (Rothe,
2019), (Kahng et al., 2019). Hence, where SoftMax fails
to predict the correct class of an adversarial example image
generated by an attacker with an aim to misclassify in a
maximum-likelihood sense, REGroup takes ranked pref-
erences from multiple layers and builds a consensus using
Borda count to make robust predictions. Our promising
empirical results indicate that deeper theoretical analysis of
REGroup would be an interesting direction to pursue.
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A. Hyper-parameters for Generating
Adversarial Examples
We use Foolbox’s (Rauber et al., 2017) implementation of
almost all the adversarial attacks used in this work. We
report the attack specific hyper-parameters in Tab.7.
B. Analyzing Pre-Activation Responses
One of the contributions of our proposed approach is to use
both positive and negative pre-activation values separately.
We observed both positive and negative pre-activation values
contain information that can help correctly classify adver-
sarially perturbed samples. An empirical validation of our
statement is shown in figure 3 of the main paper. We further
show using TSNE (van der Maaten & Hinton, 2008) plots
that all the three variants of the pre-activation feature of a
single layer i.e positive only (pos), negative only (neg) and
combined positive and negative pre-activation values forms
clusters. This indicates that all three contain equivalent in-
formation for discriminating samples from others. While on
one hand where ReLU like activation functions discard the
negative pre-activation responses, we consider negative re-
sponses equivalently important and leverage them to model
the layerwise behaviour of class samples. The benefit of
using positive and negative accumulators is it reduce the
computational cost significantly e.g flattening a convolution
layer gives a very high-dimensional vector while accumula-
tor reduce it to number of filter dimensions.
C. Accuracy vs no. of layer/voters(ResNet50)
We report the performance of REGroup on various attacks
reported in table 2 of the main paper for all possible values
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Attack Hyper-parameters
PGD (Untargeted)  = 4, Dist:L∞, random start=True,stepsize=0.01, max iter=40
DeepFool (Untargeted)  = 2, Dist:L2, max iter=100,subsample=10 (Limit on the number of the most likely classes)
CW (Untargeted)  = 4, Dist:L2, binary search steps=5, max iter=1000,confidence=0, learning rate=0.005, initial const=0.01
Trust Region (Untargeted)  = 2, Dist:L∞
Boundary (Untargeted)
 = 2, Dist:L2, iterations=500, max directions=25, starting point=None, initialization attack=None,
log every n steps=None, spherical step=0.01, source step=0.01, step adaptation=1.5,
batch size=1, tune batch size=True, threaded rnd=True, threaded gen=True
Spatial (Untargeted)  = 2, Dist=L2, do rotations=True, do translations=True, x shift limits=(-5, 5),y shift limits=(-5, 5), angular limits=(-5, 5), granularity=10, random sampling=False, abort early=True
PGD (Targeted) Dist = L∞, binary search=True, epsilon=0.3,stepsize=0.01, iterations=40, random start=True, return early=True
CW (Targeted) binary search steps=5, max iterations=1000, confidence=0,learning rate=0.005, initial const=0.01, abort early=True
SPSA  = 2
EAD Dist=L2, binary search steps=5, max iterations=1000, confidence=0,initial learning rate=0.01, regularization=0.01, initial const=0.01, abort early=True
PGD (Untargeted,HC) min conf=0.9, Dist=L∞, binary search=True, epsilon=0.3,stepsize=0.01, iterations=40, random start=True, return early=True
PGD (Targeted,HC) min conf=0.9, Dist=L∞, binary search=True, epsilon=0.3,stepsize=0.01, iterations=40, random start=True, return early=True
Table 7. Attack Specific Hyper-parameters.
of k. The accuracy of ResNet-50 w.r.t. the various values of
k is plotted in figure 6.
D. REGroup Demo
The REGroup demo code is provided at
https://github.com/lokender/REGroup . The code is
based on VGG19 classifier and CIFAR10 dataset.
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(a) ResNet-50 46th Layer (CONV) (b) ResNet-50 48th Layer (CONV) (c) ResNet-50 50th Layer (FC)
(d) VGG-19 17th Layer (FC) (e) VGG-19 18th Layer (FC) (f) VGG-19 19th Layer (FC)
Figure 5. TSNE visualization of three variants of pre-activation features i.e positive only (pos), negative only (neg) and combined positive
and negative (combined). Visualization of 50 samples of 5 random classes of ImageNet dataset. Class membership is color coded. The
dimensions of the pos, neg and combined variants of pre-activation feature is the same for any fully connected layer, while for a CONV
layer, pos and neg has the same dimension which is equal to the no. of filters/feature maps of the respective CONV layer and for combined
it is equal to the dimension we get after flattening the whole CONV layer. It can be observed in figure(b) that the cluster formed by
combined pre-activation feature responses is not a tight as formed by pos and neg separately, which shows the importance of considering
pos and neg re-activation responses separately.
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Figure 6. Ablation study for accuracy vs no. of layers (k) on ResNet-50: ‘Agg’ stands for using aggregated Borda count B:ky . PGD,
DFool, C&W and Trust Region are the same experiments as reported in table 2 of the main paper, but with all possible values of k.
”Per Layer V10K” stands for evaluation using per layer Borda count i.e ŷ = argmaxy B
`y on a separate 10,000 correctly classified
subset of validation set. In all our experiments we choose the k-highest layers where ‘Per Layer V10K’ has at-least 75% accuracy. A
reasonable change in this accuracy criteria of 75% would not affect the results on adversarial attacks significantly. However, a substantial
change (to say 50%) deteriorates the performance on clean sample significantly. The phenomenon of decrease in accuracy of clean
samples vs robustness has been studied in (Dohmatob, 2018) and (Tsipras et al., 2018). Note: There are four down-sampling layers in the
ResNet-50 architecture, hence the total 54 layers.
